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Abstract 
 
Cyber Warfare is widely touted to be the next generation of warfare.  As America’s 
reliance on automated systems and information technology increases, so too does the 
potential vulnerability to cyber attack.  Nation and non-nation states are developing the 
capability to wage cyber warfare.  Historically, the Air Force and DoD have concentrated 
their efforts toward defensive network operations.  However, a shift in doctrine has 
shown both the Air Force and DoD acknowledging the potential for Information Warfare.  
What appears to be lacking is the trained and educated cyber warrior force that will carry 
out the information operations if needed.  This research project examines the doctrine of 
DoD and national agencies to engage in information operations and efforts in place to 
train cyber warriors.  In turn, this research project offers recommendations for a career 
development and progression model for an Air Force Cyber Warrior force.   
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I. Introduction 
Background 
Information warfare (IW) is real.  The threat is real.  The potential for conflict 
centered around IW appears real.  
The competition for information is as old as human conflict. It is virtually a 
defining characteristic of humanity. Nations, corporations, and individuals each 
seek to increase and protect their own store of information while trying to limit 
and penetrate the adversary's…As information systems permeate our military and 
civilian lives, we are crossing a new frontier - the Information Age. It will define 
the 21st century and influence all we do as an air force. Information Warfare has 
become central to the way nations fight wars, and will be critical to Air Force 
operations in the 21st century.  [1]   
 
These viewpoints were taken from Cornerstones of Information Warfare, dated 
1995.  Nearly ten years ago, Air Force leadership recognized the future trend toward IW.  
Even the current Air Force Chief of Staff, General John Jumper, sees IW as an integral 
part of Air Force operations.  “I picture myself around that same targeting table where 
you have the fighter pilot, the bomber pilot, the special operations people and the 
information warriors.  As you go down the target list, each one takes a turn raising his or 
her hand saying, I can take that target” [2].  Will America ever see an actual information 
war?  Who knows…these key military leaders certainly appear to think it’s a real 
possibility and one the Air Force needs to prepare for.  But what exactly is IW?  
According to the USAF Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for Information Operations 
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(IO), IW is defined as, “The theory of warfare in the information environment that guides 
the application of information operations to produce specific battlespace effects in 
support of commander’s objectives” [3].  A more broad definition however, comes from 
Dr Ivan Goldberg, researcher of information warfare, who says  
Information warfare is the offensive and defensive use of information and 
information systems to deny, exploit, corrupt, or destroy, an adversary's 
information, information-based processes, information systems, and computer-
based networks while protecting one's own.  Such actions are designed to achieve 
advantages over military or business adversaries.  [4]   
 
Vulnerabilities 
But why has information warfare become such a threat?  Possibly because of the 
value of information as stated above.  It may also be due to the fact that America is so 
dependent on information that it makes us vulnerable to attack.  In 1998, it was estimated 
that 62 million Americans used the Internet to communicate, bank, shop, and do business 
[5].  And today there are over 200 million Americans on-line [6].  And not only are 
civilians vulnerable to IW due to their heavy reliance upon information and information 
systems, but the United States has a technologically advanced military who are also very 
connected.  That dependence however, also leaves us vulnerable as well.  “…a 
combination of cost concerns and the superiority of established commercial systems have 
created a situation in which an estimated 95 percent of all military communications travel 
over commercial systems” [7].  So not only is the average American susceptible to an 
information attack, but so is the military. 
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Threats 
So is IW the only real threat?  That’s probably a difficult question to answer 
absolutely, however there are several authorities who feel it would be difficult to match 
the United State’s and their allies’ military might.   
Without doubt, the United States is the primary superpower in the world today.  
The end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the coalition 
victory in Iraq have all demonstrated the military dominance of U.S. forces. 
Despite substantial forces reductions in recent years, the United States and the 
Western European Allies will likely remain the most powerful military powers in 
the world for the near future.  [8] 
 
A common theory among many military leaders and strategists is that China is the 
only remaining serious military threat to the US.  However, according to a recent 
Pentagon report [9], there’s even speculation as to whether or not their military might is 
capable of matching ours.  The report stated, “…China’s leaders believe their military 
forces are not yet strong enough to compete directly with the American military.”   
Consequently, China has embarked on a new strategy they think may help level the 
playing field.  Specifically, “the concept appears to include a range of weapon systems 
and technologies related to information warfare…” which makes the threat of IW even 
more real.  From that, one could easily conclude there’s little threat of conventional war 
against the United States.  Unfortunately however, that means the threat of asymmetrical 
warfare, in particular information warfare, remains real.  According to the U.S. Army’s 
Doctrine for Asymmetric Warfare, “…asymmetric warfare deals with unknowns, with 
surprise in terms of ends, ways, and means.  The more dissimilar the opponent, the more 
difficult it is to anticipate his actions...” [10].  And with America’s heavy dependence on 
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information and technology, IW becomes a very logical means for an adversary to exploit 
that dependence.   
Not only are nation-states like China actively pursuing the cyber domain and the 
potential it offers, but information attacks and the ease with which they can be carried out 
appear to be of great interest to terrorist organizations as well.  Al Qaeda is said to be 
engaged in the information warfare arena.  Richard Clarke, former Special Adviser for 
Cyberspace Security, said of Al Qaeda, “…these people are gathering skills in cyber war 
capability…I think it suggests that someday we may see Al Qaeda, if it's still alive and 
operating, use cyberspace as a vehicle for attacking infrastructure -- not with bombs, but 
with bytes” [11].  And he’s not alone in his opinion.  Analysts with iDefense, purportedly 
the nation's only independent cyber intelligence company, claim Malaysia is one of the 
newest breeding grounds for cyber terrorists with the United States being one of their 
primary targets [12].   
This information tends to support the theory that IW is a distinct possibility.  
Several senior military leaders clearly stated their beliefs that IW is the way wars will be 
fought in the future, the question is, are we ready?  This research project examines that 
question.  It looks at how the Air Force and DoD have shifted their doctrine from a 
defensive posture to one which includes offensive information operations.  This project 
examines how several Air Force career fields train and qualify their individuals and uses 
key elements of those processes to recommend a career development and progression 
model for an Air Force Cyber Warrior force.   
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II. Current Situation 
Defensive Posture 
So how prepared is the United States and its military to defend against an 
information warfare attack?  Much of that is up for speculation, but clearly based on 
comments from past and present Air Force leadership, they’ve had IW in their crosshairs 
for the last decade.  However, considering efforts dealing with military network 
operations, they have focused primarily on the defensive aspects of network operations, 
labeled NetD, for network defense [13].  Several years ago, the Air Force realized the 
significance of the cyber threat that exists and took proactive steps to address it.  In 1997, 
Air Force leaders conceived the notion of a new philosophy toward their networks and 
information systems.  In January 1998, they formalized that notion and established a 
program entitled Operationalizing and Professionalizing the Network (OPTN) in order to 
apply the same operational rigor toward Air Force networks that the Air Force uses with 
weapons systems.  OPTN established a structured, hierarchical management system with 
operations centers at the base, major command, and Air Force levels.  It offered a 
structured training and equipping philosophy in an attempt to follow the lead of weapons 
systems.  OPTN also adopted mainstream operational reporting of Air Force network 
statuses and graduated response measures in the event of an information attack.  
Although the focus was heavily process-oriented, it began to address the key concerns 
Air Force leadership had toward defending Air Force networks from outside attacks [14].  
In 1998, then Air Force Chief of Staff, General Mike Ryan, articulated this even more 
clearly in a memorandum which stated “We continue to experience incidents on our 
networks which reinforce the need for improved network protection.”  He went on to 
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direct actions to install defensive network monitoring tools and procedures to improve the 
security of Air Force networks [15].  The Department of Defense (DoD) made an even 
louder statement about the importance of network security that year when they activated 
a new joint service operations center to manage military networks called the Joint Task 
Force (JTF) for Computer Network Defense (JTF-CND).  Their primary focus, 
“…coordinating and directing the defense of DoD computer systems and computer 
networks,” was ensuring the integrity and availability of those networks and keeping 
potential adversaries out [16].  
With the OPTN structure still relatively new, the Air Force sought to beef up their 
approach to defending its networks by integrating more robust and dynamic network 
defense systems into them.  Firewalls, proxy servers, and intrusion detection systems all 
became common place in network control centers around the world.  However, dissimilar 
systems were surfacing which caused configuration management problems and ultimately 
weakened the overall security.  The lack of centralized funding caused major commands 
and individual bases to fend for themselves with end-of-year monies to procure as much 
defense as they could.  However, in 2000 the Air Force formalized their stance on 
network defense by directing the standardize purchase and installation of the Network 
Management System-Base Information Protection suite of hardware and software [17].  
Although funding was still sparse, this step showed the Air Force was making an earnest 
effort to address the issue of defending the precious nature of information systems.   
In addition to targeting the multitude of management and security issues 
associated with running networks, the OPTN effort discovered training to be a significant 
hurdle.  Training was, and still is, one of the greatest challenges facing Air Force leaders 
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as they attempt to get networks operating as weapons systems.  OPTN created a network 
operations crew structure with specific duties to emulate the aircrew system seen in 
aircraft and operations centers.  These crews would man the base-level network control 
centers and major command network operations and security centers with several 
positions created specifically for network defense, such as boundary protection and 
intrusion detection.  Career field managers for the communications and information 
career fields began adding network defense training in enlisted 5-, and 7-skill level 
technical schools to prepare them for their new crew-oriented duties.  While the basic 
courses addressed boundary protection and intrusion detection, advanced courses covered 
topics such as reconnaissance, malicious logic, and the insider threat [18].  
Communications and information officers were also receiving the basics in network 
warfare, information operations, security and availability in their initial and mid-level 
training schools, further showing the Air Force’s emphasis on the importance of properly 
defending their networks [19].   
A Shift Toward Offensive Operations 
However, for nearly a decade, the Air Force and DoD have seen a shift in strategy 
to include offensive information operations.  Lessons learned from the exploits of 
information and information systems during Operation DESERT STORM had already led 
the Air Force to create the Air Force Information Warfare Center (AFIWC).  Although its 
mission did not initially include offensive operations, the creation of the AFIWC signaled 
an awareness that the Air Force saw the direction of future warfare.  Several year later 
however, the AFIWC roles did shift to be the Air Force lead for developing tactics and 
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training for offensive and defensive counterinformation [20].  But, the Air Force’s Global 
Engagement document, created in 1996, included Information Superiority as a new core 
competency for the Air Force.  It defined Information Superiority to be “…the capability 
to collect, process, analyze and disseminate information while denying an adversary's 
ability to do the same.”  The definition alone implies an offensive capability when it talks 
of “…denying an adversary’s ability to do the same.”  And the document goes on to state 
“The Air Force will aggressively expand its efforts in defensive IW as it continues to 
develop its offensive IW capabilities” [21].  The Air Force went on to formalize the 
inclusion of Information Operations in the spectrum of future warfare by creating Air 
Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-5, Information Operations, in 1998.  In it is stated: 
“The Air Force believes information operations include actions taken to gain, exploit, 
defend, or attack information and information systems.”  Had there previously been any 
doubt about Air Force views of offensive information operations, AFDD 2-5 made them 
clear [22].  Yet another signal that the times were changing was when the joint services 
organization responsible for command and control warfare (C2W), the Joint Command 
and Control Warfare Center, was redesignated the Joint Information Operations Center in 
1999.  C2W is “The integrated use of operations security, military deception, 
psychological operations, electronic warfare, and physical destruction, mutually 
supported by intelligence, to deny information to, influence, degrade, or destroy 
adversary command and control capabilities…” [23], in which there is no mention of 
offensive information operations.  However, their new mission is now the integration of 
Information Operations (IO) into military plans and operations across the spectrum of 
conflict, where IO is defined as “…actions taken to affect adversary information and 
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information systems while defending one's own…”  This signaled the inclusion of IO 
tactics and capabilities into Joint operational war plans [24].  Equally significant, the 
JTF-CND was also redesignated as the JTF for Computer Network Operations in 2001 
and was explicitly given the new mission of Computer Network Attack (CNA) [25].  
Where their previous mission was exclusively “…defense of DoD computer systems and 
computer networks…” [26], it explicitly stated “The CNA mission is to coordinate, 
support and conduct, at the direction of the president, computer network attack operations 
in support of regional and national objectives.”  The Air Force continued its refinement 
of information operations and continues to show an increasing trend toward offensive 
operations.  In February 2004, the Air Force published the Concept of Operations for 
Information Operations (IO CONOPS).  In it, the CONOPS specifically addresses 
network attack operations (NetA) as a capability for future combat operations which 
would be integrated into existing conventional planning.  NetA is defined in the 
CONOPS as “…the employment of network-based capabilities to destroy, disrupt, 
corrupt or usurp information resident in or transiting through networks” [27].  
Additionally, AFDD 2-5, is in its final rounds of coordination and also includes network 
attack as an integral part of the Air Force’s mission. 
What appears to be missing from this clear shift in offensive operations is any 
mention of who will implement them.  The Air Force is structured in a way that offensive 
weapons are employed by officers flying weapons systems.  This project continues that 
premise and creates a career force development model to produce qualified officers to 
employ offensive information weapons. 
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III.  Methodology 
Overview 
Having provided background into vulnerabilities from America’s dependence on 
information and information systems, and the potential threat of future information 
warfare, the next logical step may very well be determining how the Air Force creates the 
cyber warrior force needed to defend and fight those potential cyber wars.  But before 
that question can be answered, it’s necessary to familiarize the reader with the 
methodology and terminology used in the development of this report.  Although this 
research effort is not based on the results of laboratory experimentation, the same 
structured methods used to develop a well organized experiment are applied here as well.  
To assist in this development, the structured approach identified by Raj Jain in his book, 
The Art of Computer Systems Performance Analysis [28] is followed.   If implemented, 
this approach will aid in determining the effectiveness of the model and the factors 
applied during implementation. 
Goal 
The goals of this project are to develop and document a proposed model for 
officer career development and progression within Information Operations, specifically, 
Network Warfare Operations (NW Ops).  This model includes recommendations for 
education, training, experience and assignment types, all necessary components for 
producing a qualified Air Force cyber warrior force.  This model can be used to support 
future offensive network attack operations. 
 
21 
Approach 
The approach used to produce this NW Ops professional development model 
includes the analysis of other career field progression models.  Specifically, the specialty 
fields of acquisition, medical, space operations and rated operations are examined in 
order to ensure any recommendations for the NW Ops workforce made are consistent 
with proven mainstream Air Force processes.  Although the development of an NW Ops 
career force may be a new proposal, this approach does not depart from established 
processes.  Based on these analyses, a solution is recommended for developing Air Force 
NW Ops personnel from accession through senior leader positions.  The author is keenly 
aware of the significant challenges associated with changes in a system as large and 
complex as that of the Air Force, to include the substantial investment required to adopt 
these changes.  However, due to the scope of this project, it is difficult to address in 
sufficient detail all the resource requirements, whether personnel or finances, needed to 
implement any potential recommendations made here. 
System Boundaries 
With the goals and the approach stated, it’s important to define the scope of the 
model.  In this project, it is initially tempting to define the boundaries of the system under 
test as the Air Force in its entirety, since the Air Force has the ultimate effect on the 
success or failure of this effort.  However, that definition quickly becomes unwieldy as 
one tries to determine how to manage all the many facets of the Air Force.  It was also 
tempting to limit the system to only the individuals who may pursue the NW Ops career 
force.  But that proved too limiting when analyzing the parameters which affect them.  
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Based on that, the definition for the system defined by this project is the elements of the 
Air Force which have a significant effect on the individuals, namely the personnel 
system, assignment system, training system, and the organizations cyber warriors are 
assigned as reflected in Figure 1.  Using the model which Jain defines as a system, that 
leaves the individual as the component under study or test. 
 
Figure 1 – System Boundaries 
System Services 
Regardless of how a system is defined, each system provides one or more services 
which a user can request.  The same holds true for this research effort.  Having 
established the system as the individual and the elements of the Air Force which directly 
affect them, the services generated by the component under test, the individual, are of 
greatest interest.  The services generated by them are simply the education, training, 
experience, and qualifications of the individual which make them capable of defending 
Air Force, or DoD networks, or attacking those of their adversaries as necessary.   
 
NW Ops Career Force 
Development ModelSyst m Under Test 
Workload        ( 
Assignment System        Personne 
\ Component * 
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System 
ations 
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Workload 
In general, the workload for a system is defined as a list of service requests.  For 
the system identified in this report, workload is the demands placed on the individual as 
they progress through the career force process.  These demands include education and 
training demands during periods of qualification, and various tasks levied upon them to 
demonstrate their proficiency or execute network defensive or offensive actions.   
Performance Metrics 
Performance is a key criterion in the design of any system.  Performance is also 
key to the system and the processes ultimately proposed in this report.  With the 
component under test identified as the individual, performance measures must be created 
to determine the success of individuals as they progress through their careers.  Several 
metrics could potentially measure that success, but for the purposes of this effort, those 
listed below are used. 
 
− Time required to meet qualification standards for assigned special experience 
identifier (SEI).  Unit of measure:  months per SEI (categorized by SEI) 
− Number and types of SEI obtained.  Unit of measure:  SEI(s) obtained (based on 
final SEI categories) 
− Successful completion of assigned training or education.  Unit of measure:  
Training/education module pass rate (ratio of successful modules / modules 
attempted) 
− Successful completion of incremental performance measures (e.g. checkrides, 
exams, etc.)  Unit of measure:  Check ride or exam pass rate (ratio of successful 
check rides or exams / check rides or exams attempted) 
− Successful career progression (rank attained before separation)  Unit of measure:  
Categorical unit of final rank attained 
− On-time promotion success.  Unit of measure:  On-time promotion rate (ratio of 
on-time promotions / promotion boards met) 
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System Parameters 
Parameters are defined as characteristics which affect the performance of the 
system.  Parameters can either be system parameters, which directly apply to the system, 
or workload parameters, which vary the workloads.  Although not an all-inclusive list, 
system parameter which could possibly affect the performance of the individual include: 
− Previous experience.  The experience an individual has upon entering the NW 
Ops career force can have a significant effect on their success.  Whether obtained 
from a former career field or through personal study and experience, those skills 
could enhance their ability to learn additional skills or progress through their 
training or assigned tasks. 
− The Air Force Assignment System.  Aligning the individual with proper 
assignment which will afford them the opportunity to train and develop their skills 
will certainly affect their success. 
− The Air Force Personnel and Finance Systems.  Overall, the Air Force Personnel 
System has a significant affect on the potential success of an individual.  In 
addition to assignments, other programs, to include pay, allowances, and 
incentives, which in turn affect the morale of the individual (whether financial or 
not) can affect the success of their career.   
− Supervisors.  Supervisors can also affect the success of an individual.  If not 
appreciated, or recognized for their efforts, individuals can easily become 
disenchanted with the Air Force which in turn could affect their success.  Also, 
supervisors have a great deal of control over training allocations and other 
opportunities which may impact the success of an individual. 
− Air Force Budget.  Changes in the Air Force budget can affect the training dollars, 
equipment, systems, etc., available at the unit level which can ultimately affect an 
individual’s success. 
− Deployments.  Similar to assignments, deployment opportunities can have both 
positive and negative affects on an individual and in turn potentially impact their 
success. 
− Training and education demands.  Coursework, performance evaluations, and 
examinations are all items which can clearly affect the success of the individual.  
The intensity or frequency of these can ultimately determine an individual’s 
ability to perform. 
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Workload Parameters 
Since workloads for this project are the service requests levied on the individual, 
changes in those demands can clearly affect the success of the individual.  Workload 
parameters include: 
− Educational requirements  
− Training demands 
− Evaluations 
− Examinations 
− Performance tasks 
 
However, when considering the definition of the system and component under 
test, it tends to lend itself to the performance tasks as being the only real demand placed 
on the individuals.  Since the personnel, assignment, and training systems are all part of 
the larger system under test, the other parameters above are better suited as system 
parameters and are included there. 
Factors 
As with parameters, factors are also characteristics which affect the performance 
of the system.  Factors are essentially the subset of parameters which are varied in order 
to see the resulting outcomes.  If the recommendations of this report are implemented, 
factors need to be identified in order to see the impact on the process and its individuals.  
The factors the author feels would be the most applicable to the system and processes 
proposed in this report are Previous Experience and Training/Education demands.  Since 
the NW Ops career force manning will initially come from existing career fields, it would 
be worth studying to see how well the various individuals in various positions succeed 
based on their backgrounds.  Additionally, it would be worth determining how much 
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education and training the individuals need to perform the tasks levied upon them as 
requirements of the cyber warrior force are better defined.   
Evaluation Technique 
The evaluation technique is the method or methods in which the system is tested 
to accomplish the goals of the experiment.  Techniques include mathematical modeling, 
computer simulations, and direct measurement.  The selection of the right technique 
depends on the time and resources available to measure it.  The most appropriate 
evaluation technique for this model would be direct measure.  Unfortunately in this 
project, the timeframe needed to collect many of those metrics will span several years.  It 
may be possible to generate a computer simulation which could predict some aspects of 
these processes, but that would have to be addressed in a separate study.   
Experimental Design 
Using direct measurements as the technique, this experiment produces a succinct 
design which minimizes the complexity.  In many experiments, there are multiple factors, 
and multiple levels of each, which can be varied to perform the experiment.  The typical 
experiment is done in two phases, where in the initial phase multiple factors are tested, 
but with a small number of levels.  In the second phase, a subset of factors are tested, but 
at increased levels.  In this project, there are only two factors recommended, which 
facilitates the execution of it.  However, considering the multitude of options for the 
education and training factor, it’s possible to scope a more complex experiment if 
additional considerations need to be addressed.   
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Likely candidates for inclusion in the cyber warrior force, include 
Communications and Information personnel, Intelligence personnel, Engineers, and 
possibly others.  Considering those career fields, a reasonable division of backgrounds or 
previous experience, may very well be the Communications and Information career field 
(33Sx), compared with all others.  Likewise, another possible division of previous 
experience may be those with technical undergraduate degrees, compared with those 
without (provided individuals are selected who didn’t complete technical undergraduate 
programs).  This report is advocating that all individuals considered for the cyber warrior 
force complete technical undergraduate programs, but determining their success with or 
without one may be a useful result of this experiment.  This report proposes to arrange 
the experiment based on varying the previous experience category by previous career 
field, and undergraduate program.  Additionally, this report proposes to vary the 
education and training factor by adjusting the amount of network and security 
fundaments offered.  Individuals with backgrounds in networking or security may be 
successful without reaccomplishing those areas.   
Below is a simple matrix that shows proposed combinations of factors to scope 
the experiment.   
Table 1 - Experiment Design 
Previous experience Completed network and 
security education and 
training. 
Bypassed network and 
security education and 
training. 
Comm and Info (33Sx)   
With technical undergraduate degree   
Without technical undergraduate degree   
All Other career fields   
With technical undergraduate degree   
Without technical undergraduate degree   
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Analyzing and Interpreting Results 
Upon completion of the experimental data collection of the performance metrics 
above, this project proposes an analysis on the factors to determine the effects caused by 
each.  The analysis will use a full-factoral design to determine if there is any significant 
difference in the success of individuals, using the categories matrixed in table 1.  The 
effects will be analyzed for their significance and interactions.  These results will allow 
career field managers to tailor the education and training tracks to produce the most 
effective system to produce cyber warriors  
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IV.  Analysis 
Creating The Force 
The next step to consider is how the Air Force should proceed to create a cyber 
warrior force.  It must be stated at this point that a great deal of effort across the Air 
Force has been directed toward the development of an information operations career 
force.  In March of 2003, the Air Force approved the Information Operations Strategic 
Plan which was created to “…increase IO capability and effectiveness through a 
combination of doctrinal, programmatic, and organizational improvements” [29].  
Additionally, the Air Force created the IO Implementation plan, “…to provide a process 
to integrate IO capabilities and provide the warfighter with a viable means to achieve 
non-kinetic effects” [30].  A key aspect of the plan was the creation of the Information 
Operations Steering Group (IOSG).  The IOSG oversees the myriad of issues dealing 
with information operations, to include the task of creating an IO career force.  The IO 
Strategic Plan, based on direction from Defense Planning Guidance 04-09 (DPG 04-09), 
directed the IOSG to develop an Air Force IO career force [31] .  DPG 04-09 directed all 
component services to create a professional IO force, but did not specify details on how it 
was to be done.  Although the IOSG will address the IO career force in its entirety, 
covering electronic warfare operations, network warfare operations, and influence 
operations, the scope of this project will only address network warfare operations, 
specifically network defense (NetD) and network attack (NetA). 
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Personnel System Issues 
The efforts of IOSG have not only wrestled with what the professional 
development requirements for a new IO career force should be, but also those of the 
personnel system in order to manage newly trained IO career force professionals.  One 
important point from the IO steering group efforts is that they advocate what could be 
considered as part-time IO professionals who will move in and out of IO billets rather 
than remaining in them through their career [32].  Additionally, the IO roadmap also 
recommends that personnel identified to work information operations receive tours that 
would alternate them between information operations jobs and those of their traditional 
career field [33].  However, others advocate an entirely different shift in perspective, that 
of a truly professional full-time information operations force.  Through his research on 
this subject at Air Command and Staff College (ACSC), Major Jonathan Sutherland 
concluded about the part-time IO approach, “Sending a college graduate to the field for a 
few tours of general expertise interspersed with training classes and then expecting first-
rate information techniques in a more specialized tour later is not adequate” [34] 
The development of a truly professional force is essential to ensuring these 
individuals receive the training, assignments, and leadership opportunities to be 
successful in their careers.  Those advocates recommend this be done by the creation of a 
new Air Force Specialty Code (AFSC) which would completely identify them as a 
separate career field.  However, the IOSG maintains that individuals will remain in their 
existing AFSC but receive a Special Experience Identifier (SEI) as a means to identify 
the specialized IO experience they’ve gained.  Regardless of whether a new AFSC is 
created or not, this report advocates that individuals be trained, tracked, and managed as 
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information operations professionals, and that they not be rotated or alternated through 
assignments, or ever be considered part-time. 
Determining Force Size 
One thing that may be agreed upon is that irrespective of how the individuals are 
coded and tracked, there will likely be no new forces to access into the IO career force.   
According to the Air Force Chief of Staff, “By the end of 2005, we should reduce the size 
of our active force by 16,000 people…” [35].  Consequently, all individuals identified to 
be IO career course professionals will undoubtedly come from existing forces.  Naturally 
there may be some hesitation among career field managers to release individuals from 
their existing career fields to populate this new IO force.  Unfortunately, the reality may 
be that if the Air Force wants to ensure a truly professional force, that’s a level of pain 
that needs to be endured.   
A difficult step in making that happen is determining the exact numbers to 
populate the career force with.  Typically the Air Force mans specialties based on 
specific organizational requirements or by inventory (based on a specified percentage of 
the force) [36].  To facilitate the management of the new NW Ops career force, this 
report recommends an inventory-based approach until the NW Ops career force has the 
opportunity to mature and potentially drive more refined requirements.  Likely sources or 
career fields to draw from would be the communications and information career field, 
intelligence career fields, or engineering career fields.  However there are undoubtedly 
individuals in a multitude of career fields who possess the fundamental skills or 
educational background to easily transition into the information operations career force 
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area.  One possibly approach may be to survey the Air Force to find these individuals.   
Regardless of the source, a key to successful development of the NW Ops career 
force will be the correct balance of education, training, assignments, and job experience.  
The information warrior must know not only programming but systems 
integration and systems theory, communications, security, artificial intelligence, 
logic in all its many forms (classical, fuzzy, and convergent), and statistical 
techniques. The information warrior must also know the customer’s needs: the 
commander’s intent, doctrine, and strategy. The amount of information necessary 
to be an information warrior is immense, and the time required to master it would 
have to be at the expense of a more general command instruction.  [37] 
 
Referencing Other Career Field Models 
Acquisition 
The right balance of these areas is certainly not new to the Air Force, nor other 
career fields.  For example, the acquisition community has categorized all positions and 
all assignments by certification level.  They’ve done this in an effort to ensure that only 
fully trained and qualified personnel occupy those critical billets.  They’ve also included 
the prerequisite education requirements to fill those assignments and the job experience 
requirements to gain additional certifications if necessary to remain in them.  They have 
well-established courses all individuals must attend at various levels which prepare them 
for the job responsibilities commensurate with those certification levels.  Senior leaders 
in the acquisition community must not only meet the highest level of certification, but 
they have additional statutory requirements that must be met [38]. 
Medical corps 
In the medical corps, they too have a multitude of educational and job 
requirements to ensure their force is professionally trained and qualified.  In addition to 
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the minimum education requirements of medical school, they must complete a minimum 
of one year of graduate training and examinations in order to obtain a medical license for 
the state in which they practice.  Beyond that, they need an additional three years of 
training to be a fully qualified doctor.  In addition to clinical experience, they are required 
to complete approximately 50 hours of continuing education units per year just to 
maintain their state license.  As they advance through their career and attain advanced 
specialties, they may complete board certifications for those added specialties.  With each 
certification comes a list of criteria they must meet in order to retain them.  In addition to 
state and board certification requirements, each clinic or hospital may specify skills 
requirements specific to their facility and position.  Proficiency is maintained through the 
numbers and types of procedures they complete in clinical practice, and the arduous peer 
and senior staff review process they participate in.  Lastly, advanced education is strongly 
emphasized as well.  At any point in time, there are approximately 25 percent of all 
doctors in graduate education programs [39]. 
Space Operations 
An interesting development in the space operations career field recently is the 
establishment of a space warrior cadre.  The 2001 Space Commission contended Air 
Force and DoD Space Operations personnel were not adequately trained or educated and 
“…are not yet on course to develop the space cadre the nation needs.”  As a result, the 
space operations career field is undergoing a change in how they train, educate, and 
manage their space professionals.  Similar in design to that of the acquisition career field 
model, all space operations billets will be reviewed and identified for required experience 
and certification levels to work them.  They too will create a three-tiered certification 
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system in which individuals will progress from accession through senior leadership 
positions.  At each level, will be a mandatory course which will provide them the 
necessary education to fill assignments at that level.  And similar to how the IOSG has 
advocated special experience identifiers to track IO career force professionals, they will 
create specialty codes, or specs, in order to manage individuals based on the various 
specialties that they attained [40]. 
Rated Operations 
Lastly, in looking at the rated operations career field, one sees what may 
understandably be the most stringent technical training requirement in terms of war 
fighting proficiency skills.  Each pilot completes undergraduate pilot training which 
qualifies them for initial training into their weapon system.  At their weapon system entry 
school, they receive initial qualification training (IQT) where they learn the systems and 
operations, to include all facets of emergencies.  This training entails many hours of both 
simulator and aircraft flying time.  They complete numerous check rides which combine 
both open and close book examinations, covering both normal and emergency 
procedures.  This rigorous training ensures pilots are proficient in the critical skills 
necessary to execute their duties in a wartime environment.  At their first duty station, 
they proceed through mission qualification training (MQT) where they develop the 
proficiency to fly the aircraft through all facets of its designed capabilities and to employ 
all the weapons systems equipped on that aircraft.  They are also required to maintain 
currency by flying a pre-determined number of hour in training sorties which are 
representative of the mission of the aircraft and its weapons systems.  The next steps in 
their career are potentially those of advanced flying positions to include aircraft 
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commander, for multi-pilot systems, instructor pilot, or evaluator.  The best of the best 
have the opportunity to go on to the Air Force Weapons School and become experts in 
weapons employment [41, 42]. 
Assessment and Recommendations   
Having assessed a variety of career fields and their processes for developing their 
professionals, this report recommends one for the network warfare operations specialists.  
This recommendation essentially combines many of the key elements from those above.  
As with all the career fields, it includes timely training and educational opportunities at 
key points in an individual’s progression to ensure their knowledge and skills are 
commensurate with the level of assignments they’ll hold.  Specifically, it includes an 
initial NW Ops course to offer both the theoretical and practical fundamentals of NW 
Ops which individuals will need to step into their first assignment.  Additionally, this 
recommendation includes check rides and annual standardization examinations, as used 
by the rated operations career field, to ensure individuals are able to perform the tasks 
they have been deemed qualified to perform or to employ the weapons they are qualified 
to employ.  Lastly, it also includes the requirement to complete continuing education 
units, like the medical career field, to ensure they remain current since the pace of 
technology change is so rapid.    
NW Ops Officer Requirements 
The first step in the development of the NW Ops career force is to determine, as 
much as possible, the requirements individuals will need to execute the mission of 
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network defense or attack, and thus to be successful in their careers.  Joint Publication 3-
13 identifies the following as expectations of IO professionals [43].  
 
 
Figure 2 – IO Officer Functions 
 
These requirements are levied on all IO professionals regardless of specialty.  
Clearly, they focus very heavily on the roles of planning, execution and support to a joint 
forces commander (JFC).  It seems evident that the training and experience necessary to 
be effective at that level is extensive.  Additionally, the DoD IO Roadmap further identify 
the types of knowledge and skills the individuals must possess by stating, “IO capability 
specialists should possess specialized expertise on a certain IO core capability, but gain 
experience in the planning and execution of the broader construct of IO” [44].  Based on  
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these expectations, this report attempts to identify the education, training, and experience 
requirements for NW Ops professionals to perform at these levels. 
Undergraduate Requirements 
Prior to their acceptance in the NW Ops career force, potential candidates should 
have a technical undergraduate degree.  It’s not essential that they complete an 
engineering or computer science degree, but it’s important that their undergraduate 
program be technical in nature, and includes several engineering or computer science 
courses.  This technical undergraduate program will aid the individual in their completion 
of the initial NW Ops course. 
Initial NW Ops Course 
To begin the pursuit of the NetD and NetA specialties, individuals must 
understand the fundamentals of the environment and technologies in which they work.  
This is accomplished through a rigorous course, or courses, which provide the foundation 
upon which the NW Ops specialists will build.  Although HQ ACC/SCN is working on 
potential course requirements, this report includes recommendations on the subject matter 
the courses need to address.  Table 2 outlines the course content for the initial NW Ops 
course.   
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Table 2 – Initial NW Ops Course Content 
Initial Network Warfare Operations Course Material Content 
Fundamentals of Information Warfare (IW) 
AFDD 2-5 
Information Operations (IO) 
Influence Operations (Influence Ops) 
Electronic Warfare Operations (EW Ops) 
Network Warfare Operations (NW Ops) 
Legal/Ethical Aspects of IO/IW 
Terrorism/Antiterrorism 
C4ISR 
Space Systems 
Air Operations Center (AOC) Operations 
Operational Campaign Planning 
Operations Security (OPSEC) 
Fundamentals of Network Operations 
Network Operating Systems 
Network Management Principles 
Network Infrastructure Devices 
Networking Protocols 
Air Force Enterprise Networking 
IO/IW Threats, Vulnerabilities, Methodologies, and TTPs 
Emission Security (EMSEC) 
Communications Security (COMSEC) 
Computer Security (COMPUSEC) 
Security Management 
Access Control Models 
Social Engineering 
Operating Systems Fundamentals and Vulnerabilities 
Software Vulnerabilities 
Distributed System Security 
Secure Application Development 
Malicious Logic and Scripting 
Telephones System Vulnerabilities 
Infrastructure Devices and Vulnerabilites 
Wireless Technologies and Vulnerabilities 
Data Integrity 
Encryption 
Network/computer Forensics 
Firewalls 
Proxy Servers 
Intrusion Detection Systems 
VPNs 
 
Completion of the NW Ops course is a critical lead into the NW Ops career force.  
Clearly the scope of the material covers all aspects of IO to ensure individuals understand 
the broader IO discipline.  Later in their NW Ops career, individuals will have the 
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opportunity to attend the intermediate NW Ops course where the emphasis will 
concentrate more on IO planning.  However, during the initial NW Ops course, 
individuals will concentrate more on the technical aspects of NW Ops, addressing only 
the fundamental elements of EW Ops and Influence Ops.  The initial NW Ops course will 
offer sufficient depth into networks, network security, and the elements of NW Ops 
necessary for individuals to be prepared for the demands placed on them upon 
graduation.  It will include adequate hands-on training with standard Air Force 
equipment, systems, and applications so individuals will easily transition into the 
operation of live networks at their next assignment. 
Career Path 
The initial NW Ops course is simply the first step in a long progression of 
assignments and training opportunities which ultimately leads to a qualified and 
proficient NW Ops career force.  Not all individuals will follow the same path, nor will 
all individuals attain the same levels of rank or career success.  Although there is no set 
track an individual must follow, there are elements of assignments which will allow 
individuals the opportunity to be successful.  Below are templates for assignment types 
and levels which individuals should attempt to follow to become successful NW Ops 
specialists. 
First Assignment 
Upon completion of the initial NW Ops course, personnel report to their first duty 
location.  Table 3 lists typical assignment types that individuals should receive for their 
first assignment out of the initial course. 
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They will receive additional education and training to learn the specific mission of 
their unit and parent major command, and at that point are considered initially qualified 
and enter mission qualification training (MQT).   MQT will entail qualifying for one of 
the special experience identifiers in the network control center NetD positions.  That 
qualification will include several check rides and examinations with certified evaluators.   
Table 3 - Typical NW Ops First Assignments 
Typical First Assignments Performance Requirements 
Base Network Control Centers (NCC) Systems and emergency procedures checkout 
(IQT) 
Combat Communications Squadrons  MQT – gain NCC NetD position qualification 
and SEI 
Other Communications and Information Officer 
Aerospace Communications Education billets 
Qualification and annual checkrides 
 Annual standardization and emergency 
procedures exams 
 Currency through CEUs 
 
Also at their first assignment, they need to acquire continuing education units to 
ensure they remain current and knowledgeable on trends and technologies relevant to 
network warfare issues.  Qualified individuals will demonstrate their proficiency at least 
annually through performance checkrides and annual standardization examinations.   
Second Assignment 
Upon reaching their second assignment, individuals will again be required to 
complete local check rides that will cover emergency procedures in addition to 
organizational and major command mission specifics tasks.  Table 4 lists typical 
assignment types that individuals should be considered for as second assignments.   
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Table 4 - Typical NW Ops Second Assignments 
Typical Second Assignments Performance Requirements 
Network Operations and Security Centers (NOSC) Systems and emergency procedures checkout  
Information Warfare Flights (IWF), Information 
Warfare Squadrons (IWS), Information Warfare 
Aggressor Squadrons (IWAS) 
Gain additional NetD/NetS position 
qualifications and SEIs 
Air Force Network Operations and Security Centers 
(AFNOSC) 
Learn offensive network operations TTPs 
Air Force Computer Emergency Response Team 
(AFCERT) 
Upgrade to instructor or evaluator 
Battle Labs Participate in operational exercises (e.g. 
Red/Blue Flag, Black Demon, etc.) 
 Qualification and annual checkrides 
 Annual standardization and emergency 
procedures exams 
 Currency through CEUs 
 
Their second assignment may include earning additional special experience 
identifiers in any of the network defense or network support categories, or they may 
begin to learn and practice offensive network tactics techniques and procedures.  Based 
on the rate at which they're able to progress, they may also begin to qualify as trainers or 
evaluators.  This would also be a prime opportunity for individuals to look to participate 
in operational exercises, such as Red or Blue Flags or Black Demon, that would allow 
them to apply the knowledge and skills they have gained.  During this assignment, they 
will again be subjected to multiple check rides, including annual examinations, to ensure 
they maintain their skills and proficiency.  They will also complete the required 
continuing education units to ensure they remain current with network warfare 
technologies and vulnerabilities.   
Third Assignment 
The third assignment offers qualified personnel opportunities to possibly branch 
out and explore other areas of network warfare operations.  Table 5 lists typical 
assignment types that individuals should be considered for as third assignments.   
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Table 5 - Typical NW Ops Third Assignments 
Typical Third Assignments Performance Requirements 
Competitive programs like SOS, EWI, AFIP, AFIT Emergency procedures checkout  
Executive Officer Gain additional NetD/NetS position 
qualifications and SEIs as applicable 
Staff action officer or IO planner (MAJCOM, NAF, 
DRU, FOA levels) 
Qualification and annual checkrides 
Instructor duty:  Initial NW Ops course Upgrade to evaluator or developer of TTPs 
Intermediate NW Ops Course student Participate in operational exercises (e.g. 
Red/Blue Flag, Black Demon, etc.) 
Air Operations Center Course student Annual standardization and emergency 
procedures exams 
Air Force Weapons School student Currency through CEUs 
 Staff IO planner 
 
They may be afforded the opportunity to attend Squadron Officer School in-
residence, or programs like Education With Industry (EWI), the Air Force Intern 
Program, and the Air Force Institute of Technology.  They may also have the opportunity 
to serve as an executive officer, or in other highly selective positions.  Timing would also 
put them in the window to gain additional training in the Intermediate Network Warfare 
Operations Course, Air Force Weapons School, Air Operations Center Course, or other 
courses such as those at the Joint Special Operations University [45].  Depending on their 
proficiency and rate of progression, they may be given the opportunity for assignment as 
a school house instructor at the initial NW Ops course.  Toward the end of the third 
assignment they may transition into an IO planning function if co-located with a 
Numbered Air Force (NAF) or Major Command (MAJCOM) Headquarters.  Again, they 
should take every opportunity available to participate in operational exercises to reinforce 
their skills and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs).  They may also participate 
with, or on, staff entities as evaluators or developers of the TTPs that network warfare 
operations personnel use.  As qualified NW Ops specialists, they will again be expected 
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to complete continuing education units, annual standardization examinations, and 
checkrides.   
Intermediate NW Ops Course 
After their first two or three assignments, NW Ops professionals should have the 
opportunity to attend the Intermediate NW Ops Course.  This course will build on the 
material taught in the Initial NW Ops Course and the experience individuals gain in their 
early assignments.  The course will offer advanced offensive NW Ops TTPs, and will 
emphasize IO planning, to include all aspects of IO.  As individuals become more senior, 
this course will assist them in their transition to IO planning assignments.  Table 6 
outlines the recommended course content for the Intermediate Network Warfare 
Operations Course. 
Fourth Assignment 
The fourth assignment will offer many similar opportunities as those of the third 
assignment, depending on what individuals have done to this point in their career.  Table 
7 lists typical assignment types that individuals should be considered for as fourth 
assignments.   
Table 6 – Intermediate NW Ops Course Content 
Intermediate Network Warfare Operations Course Material Content 
Terrorism/Antiterrorism Intelligence Update 
Current Trends in IO/IW Threats, Vulnerabilities, Methodologies, and TTPs 
AFDD 2-5 
Legal/Ethical Aspects of IO/IW 
Advanced Concepts in Information Operations (IO) 
Air Operations Center (AOC) Operations 
Operational Campaign Planning 
Offensive NW Ops TTPs 
IO Planning and Execution 
Influence Operations (Influence Ops) 
Electronic Warfare Operations (EW Ops) 
Network Warfare Operations (NW Ops) 
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Table 7 - Typical NW Ops Fourth Assignments 
Typical Fourth Assignments Performance Requirements 
Many of the same types as for third assignments, 
plus: 
Currency through CEUs 
Flight Commander Staff IO planner 
Highly selective programs like IDE, EWI Upgrade to evaluator or developer of TTPs 
IO planner (NAF/MAJCOM/HAF/Joint HQs levels)  
 
As more senior members, they may have the opportunity to fill key leadership 
billets such as flight commander.  Additionally, they may have the opportunity to attend 
Intermediate Developmental Education (IDE) opportunities such as ACSC, the Air Force 
Institute of Technology or the Naval Postgraduate School.  This is also the right time to  
look toward participation on NAF, MAJCOM, HQ Air Force (HAF), or Joint 
Headquarters staffs to perform IO planning and staff functions.    
Fifth Assignment 
The fifth assignment will be an even more senior assignment that may include 
IDE, instructor duty, at either the Initial or Intermediate NW Ops courses, or Air Force 
weapons school, or such typical jobs as an IO planner or staff member at various Agency, 
HAF or Joint Headquarters levels.  They may also be able to attend additional courses 
such as the Senior Information Warfare Applications Course [46].   
Subsequent Assignments 
Their sixth and subsequent assignment opportunities are increasingly more senior and 
take on additional leadership roles and responsibilities.  These may provide the 
opportunity to compete for squadron command, or attend Senior Developmental 
Education opportunities, the Joint Information Warfare Senior Officers Course at the 
National Defense University, or participate as the senior staff member involved in IO 
 
45 
doctrine at MAJCOM, HAF or Joint Headquarters levels.  Individuals at this point in 
their careers should be looked upon as the senior experts in all aspects of IO, not only 
NW Ops.  Figure 3 shows a notional career planning diagram for Network Warfare 
Operations specialties.  
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Figure 3 – Network Warfare Operations (NW Ops) Career Planning Diagram 
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V.  Conclusion 
 
Several senior military leaders and strategists have supported the idea that future 
information warfare is a distinct possibility.  The threat exists not only by nation states, 
but also by non-nation terrorist organizations, and has been substantiated by national 
security and international terrorism experts.  For nearly ten years, the Air Force and DoD 
have written IO concepts into key documents acknowledging the potential of future IW.  
For most of that decade, the Air Force and DOD have focused on a defensive posture to 
protect themselves from the potential of an information warfare attack.  However, there 
has been a clear shift in philosophy which includes integrating offensive information 
operations into operational doctrine and war plans.  What appears to be lacking however, 
is the trained and qualified information operations force with the expertise to prosecute 
an information war or employ offensive information weapons.  Last year, the Air Force 
activated the information operations steering group whose charter is to address the wide 
range of issues dealing with information operations to include the creation of an IO career 
force.  Their efforts however, do not call for a separate IO force, but rather individuals 
from other specialties who receive IO training.  Additionally, the IOSG advocates 
alternating assignments between an individual’s original career track and IO billets.  
Having assessed several existing Air Force career fields, the recommendation from this 
report is to create a new NW Ops career force who specialize in IO activities for their 
entire career.  This report also proposes a career development and progression model 
which outlines the types of assignments and performance expectations individuals should 
follow to produce a trained and qualified NW Ops career force.     
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